Dr D.K. Giri

The world is moving towards a multipolar order. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar said this in an interview he gave in New York last week on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly. This is not the first time Jaishankar has spoken of the emergence of such a world order. Whether at the Raisina Dialogue, Munich or previously in New York, he has been one of the most vocal proponents of the concept. I have disagreed with the External Affairs Minister’s theoretical interpretation several times in this column and on television. I would like to do so once again because neither history nor the current balance of global power supports the idea of a multipolar world.

First, let us understand what he actually said. Historically, the world has remained divided into two camps, whether during the First World War, the Second World War, the Cold War or even the era of globalisation. The last phase needs some elaboration because the division of power blocs was less obvious than before and international power appeared to be more dispersed. In addition, US President Donald Trump has pursued a disruptive foreign policy during his second term. It is possible that these two developments have led Jaishankar to believe that the world is moving towards multipolarity. In New York, he said, “Countries are adjusting to a changing America, and also recalibrating their relationships with China amid the breakdown of old trade assumptions.”

Jaishankar based his argument on the idea that national governments are looking to reduce risks by diversifying their partnerships. He described this adjustment as a response to a more competitive international environment. He made these comments against the backdrop of a proposed summit between Trump and Xi Jinping in Busan. According to him, the two largest economies are competing on the one hand while also cooperating on the other. He added that this competition leaves limited room for consensus between the two on global affairs.

Jaishankar made an important strategic observation that countries are looking beyond the rivalry between the two major powers, seeking new partners and trying to protect themselves from disruptions. He also described contemporary geopolitics as a paradox of diplomacy – intense competition between countries alongside deep economic interdependence.

This description is correct. The conclusion drawn from it is not.

I am somewhat surprised that Jaishankar is not actually pointing to any new development in international relations that would lead towards a multipolar world order. What he describes – countries spreading risk, diversifying their options and seeking new partners – is the oldest grammar of foreign policy. This is not multipolarity; it is multi-alignment. And the two are not the same thing.

Even in the past, when the world was divided into two camps, countries formed various alliances to pursue their national interests. Consider the major regional groupings: the European Union in 1957/1993, the Organisation of African Unity in 1963, ASEAN in 1967, the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981, the Organisation of American States in 1948 and SAARC in 1985. Yet, when it came to security, the decisive choices were made by only two camps – Washington and Moscow. Countries could trade with many nations, but the ultimate security guarantee came from one side or the other.

Why was that so? Because the measure of a pole is not how many friends you have. The real measure is who can provide security, a reserve currency, advanced technology at scale and veto power at the United Nations. In this sense, history has never truly witnessed multipolarity. During the First World War, there were two camps: the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance. During the Second World War, it was the Allies versus the Axis powers. During the Cold War, it was NATO versus the Warsaw Pact. Even the so-called unipolar era from 1991 to 2017 was, in reality, a disguised form of bipolarity – the United States and its allies on one side and the rest of the world on the other, many of them unhappy with American dominance but unable to balance it.

Globalisation certainly dispersed economic power. It enabled China to rise, India to grow and countries such as Türkiye, Brazil and Indonesia to assert themselves more strongly. But it did not disperse strategic power.

At present, the formation of two power blocs is clearly visible. On one side are the United States and Europe through NATO, along with Washington’s Indo-Pacific allies – Japan, South Korea, Australia and the Philippines. On the other is the China-Russia-Iran-North Korea axis, with Pakistan aligned with it at varying levels and some Gulf countries appearing as transactional partners. This could be described as the CRINK axis.

Look at any theatre of conflict. In Ukraine, it is NATO versus Russia, with China, Iran and North Korea providing logistical support to Moscow. In the Taiwan Strait, the United States and Japan are on one side and China on the other, with Russia backing Beijing. In West Asia, the US-Israel-Europe combination faces the Iran-Russia-China axis. In technology, the US-led semiconductor alliance stands against China’s Belt and Road network. On the currency front, there are attempts to promote yuan-ruble trade as an alternative to the dollar-euro system.

This is not multipolarity. It is classical bipolarity with more noise.

It is a different matter that Donald Trump, under his “MAGA” – Make America Great Again – strategy, is shaking up or unsettling existing US alliances. His tariff wars against Europe, Canada and Japan, his questions about Article 5 of NATO, his transactional approach towards Ukraine, and his tendency to praise Xi Jinping one day and threaten China with 100 per cent tariffs the next – all these developments create an impression of fragmentation.

But this is merely a deviation in the behaviour of one leader, not a structural transformation of the system.

Alliances built on shared experiences, shared democratic values, intelligence frameworks such as the Five Eyes and 75 years of military interoperability will not suddenly disappear. Institutions are more durable than individuals.

At the same time, while Trump may be sharp in his rhetoric, his actions have been less dramatic. He has neither withdrawn the United States from NATO nor pulled troops out of Japan, nor has he recognised Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. Therefore, a world order shaped by two major power blocs continues to exist.

There is another weakness in the argument for multipolarity. To qualify as a pole, powers must be broadly comparable. Is India a pole today? Is Brazil a pole? Is Türkiye a pole? Let us be honest.

A pole must possess three qualities: sufficient economic weight to offer an alternative market, sufficient military weight to provide an alternative security arrangement, and sufficient moral and ideological weight to offer an alternative model.

The United States possesses all three. China possesses two – economic and military strength – although its ideological model remains contested. Europe has economic and ideological weight, but it has effectively entrusted its security to the United States.

India, despite its rapid growth rate, is still an economy of roughly $4 trillion. It remains dependent on the US dollar system, Russian weapons and American technology, as well as remittances from the Gulf countries. We are a balancing power, a swing power and a bridge power. All these are useful descriptions, but they do not make us a pole.

To call oneself a pole is to mistake aspiration for capability. That is not foreign policy; it is astrology. Therefore, Jaishankar’s repeated emphasis on multi-alignment and multipolarity does not stand up to scrutiny. As mentioned earlier, multi-alignment is a basic necessity of foreign policy for any country.

Nehru practised it. Indira Gandhi did it. Vajpayee did it. Manmohan Singh did it. Modi is pursuing it more actively. India is part of the Quad as well as the SCO, of I2U2 as well as BRICS, and maintains relations with Israel as well as Palestine. This is smart diplomacy.

But multipolarity is a desire, not an existential reality. It is an idealistic hope that the world should become multipolar so that India gets more strategic space. But wishing for something does not make it happen.

India’s interest, therefore, lies not in prematurely declaring the arrival of multipolarity, but in strengthening its own capabilities so that if bipolarity eventually breaks down, India can genuinely emerge as a pole – economically self-reliant, militarily self-sufficient and ideologically pluralistic.

Until then, we should call the world what it is.